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Abstract 
In recent years, voluntary approaches are expected to function as new environmental 
protection tools. This article analyzes whether environmental information of firms 
should be mandatorily disclosed or disclosed voluntarily, where consumers consider the 
environmental burdens of firms when buying their goods. If a mandatory policy is 
implemented, every firm in the market will be required to disclose their environmental 
burdens. On the contrary, only firms that want to disclose their environmental burdens 
will share their environmental information if a voluntary approach is implemented. This 
article particularly demonstrates the effects of the disclosure rule (mandatory or 
voluntary) on investment to reduce environmental burdens. The model has two types of 
firms, clean and dirty ones. Firms that investigate their environmental burdens and turn 
out to be dirty can invest to reduce them and become clean before they disclose their 
environmental information. The main conclusions in this article are as follows. (1)  
Mandatory disclosure policies may induce firms to invest more than a voluntary 
approach. (2) Firms may have lower expected profit under the mandatory rule than the 
voluntary approach. (3) Under full information disclosure policy, the environmental 
burden is smaller than that of other policies.  
 
JEL:  D82, L15, Q55 
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1. Introduction 
This article analyzes whether environmental information of firms should be 
mandatorily disclosed or disclosed voluntarily, where consumers are conscious of the 
environmental burdens of firms. Particularly, the article analyzes the effects of the 
information disclosure rule on investment by firms for the reduction of environmental 
burdens. The reason for including the effects of investment is because this article 
assumes the following situation. If the disclosure of environmental information is 
obligated by the government, firms must examine their environmental burdens. From 
the examination, a firm understands that its environmental burden is high and 
consumers take this into account when buying their goods. In this situation, firms may 
have incentive to invest in the reduction of their environmental burden before their 
environmental information is disclosed to consumers, resulting in the possibility of 
increasing their expected profit. On the other hand, if consumers are conscious of the 
environmental burden of firms, firms have the incentive to improve their environmental 
burden voluntarily. In consequence, there may not be a need for the government to 
impose regulations if firms address their environmental issues voluntarily. Therefore, 
this article compares the effects of voluntary and mandatory disclosures of 
environmental information in the situation that investment for the reduction of 
4 
environmental burden is possible. 
Mandatory environmental information disclosure attracts attention as a policy tool 
which substitutes the existing policy tools such as emission standards and 
environmental tax. There are many studies written about the effects of mandatory 
environmental information disclosure, such as Klenindorfer and Orts (1998), Tietenberg 
(1998), Tietenberg and Wheeler (2001), and Cohen and Santhkumar (2007). The 
information disclosure policy is considered to reduce the regulator’s costs, and promote 
flexible and self-regulated environmental management (Khanna et al., 1998). In 
addition, there are problems of asymmetric information between consumers and firms. 
In many cases, consumers can not check exactly what kinds of toxic substances are 
emitted from a firm’s production process. A mandatory environmental information 
disclosure policy is expected to solve this asymmetric information. In fact, mandatory 
environmental information disclosure is introduced many countries, and a well known 
mandatory disclosure program is the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) program in the 
United States (U.S.). Other countries such as Canada, South Korea, Australia, Japan, 
Mexico, and the European Union (E.U.) also institute similar programs (Cohen and 
Santhakumar, 2007). 
On the other hand, recently many firms have incentive to disclose environmental 
5 
information voluntarily.
1
 In fact, publication of environmental reports and sales of 
goods with eco labels are methods of voluntary environmental information disclosure 
by firms. If firms voluntarily disclose their environmental information, the government 
will save financially because it will not need to obligate firms to disclose their 
environmental burdens. Voluntary environmental disclosure, however, gives firms room 
for strategic behavior. Under voluntary disclosure, firms might disclose only selective 
information. Sinclair-Desgagné and Golan (2003) analyze the strategic behavior of 
environmental information disclosure. 
Previous studies about the effects of mandatory and voluntary disclosure policies 
are Shavell (1994), Segerson (1999), and Polinsky and Shavell (2006). They analyze 
whether firms’ private information should be mandatorily disclosed or disclosed 
voluntarily when firms need to pay costs to acquire their information. In addition to 
existing studies, this article includes the effects of the disclosure policy on investment to 
improve environmental burdens. There are many studies about firms’ environmental 
quality improvement such as Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995), Innes and Bial (2002), 
and Eriksson (2004). These studies mainly analyze the strategic behavior between firms 
in the duopoly market, and do not include the asymmetric information between firms 
and consumers. 
6 
Furthermore, this article addresses two types of mandatory rules. In the previous 
studies by Shavell (1994) and Polinsky and Shavell (2006), the mandatory disclosure 
rule is the following. Firms that acquire their private information
2
 must disclose the 
information. In their analysis, therefore, firms are not obligated to acquire information, 
and if a firm does not, the information remains disclosed. In this article, we also 
investigate the mandatory disclosure rule which means that all firms in the market 
should acquire and disclose their information. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. 
Section 3 compares the mandatory and voluntary disclosure policies from the view of 
social welfare. Section 4 is the conclusion and discusses the direction of future research. 
 
2. The Model 
This article investigates the disclosure of environmental information, with the 
model based on Shavell (1994) and Polinsky and Shavell (2006). In addition to those 
existing studies, we analyze the situation in which firms can invest to improve their 
environmental burden before they disclose their environmental burden information. 
We assume a monopoly market. In the production process, a monopoly firm 
generates a per unit environmental burden e , and the unit cost of producing the good is 
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c , 0c ≥ . There are 2 types of environmental burden, { , }g be e  
and 0b ge e> > . We call 
the firm that generates a low environmental burden 
ge  as “green”, and one that 
generates a high environmental burden be  as “brown.” 
Consumers are interested in the environmental burden of a firm and are assumed to 
buy at most one unit of goods in this market. The utility of consumers is described as 
u v e pθ= − − . p  denotes the price of the good. , ( 0)v v >  is the value of this good 
for consumers and is identical for all consumers. However, v  does not include the 
environmental attribute. θ  is the marginal disutility of environmental burden of each 
consumer and is assumed to be distributed continuously with support [0, ]θ . Let ( )h θ  
be the probability density over θ  and ( )H θ  be the cumulative distribution of θ . 
This utility setting means that consumers can increase their utility by consuming a lower 
environmental burden good. On the other hand, consumers do not consider the 
environmental burdens of the entire society.
3
 Consumers who obtain positive utility, 
0v e pθ− − ≥ , would buy the goods. Therefore, demand is given by ( )
v p
H
e
−
 and 
1 ( )
v p
H
e
−
−  is consumers who do not buy the good in this market. In this article, a 
green firm can obtain a higher profit than a brown one that is ( ) ( )g be eπ π>  since the 
more the environmental burden is reduced, the larger the demand gets. 
We assume that the monopoly firm does not initially know its type of 
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environmental burden. The firm can acquire the its environmental burden information 
with cost , (0 )k k k≤ ≤ . Let ( )f k  be the probability density over , ( ( ) 0)k f k > . We 
assume that the monopoly firm knows its acquisition cost k , although consumers do 
not know k  of the firm and only knows the distribution f over k . Therefore, there 
exists an asymmetry of information between firms and consumers for the acquisition 
cost. 
We assume that a firm is green with the probability α  and brown with the 
probability 1 , (0 1)α α− < < , and this probability
 
is common knowledge between firms 
and consumers. In the case that information disclosure is not carried out at all, 
consumers infer the environmental burden of the firm as (1 )g be e eµ α α= + −  and firm 
obtains the profit { , } 0g b g be e e and e e∈ < < . 
A firm that acquires its environmental burden information can only disclose the 
environmental information to consumers.
4
 As discussed above, the more a firm reduces 
its environmental burden, the more a firm increases its expected profit ( )eπ . 
Following the above setting, we compare the three policies, voluntary disclosure 
and two types of mandatory disclosure of environmental information. The sequence of 
actions is as follows. 
[Stage 1] First, each firm decides whether to acquire its environmental burden 
9 
information with cost ( 0)k > . Consumers do not know whether or not a monopoly firm 
acquires its environmental information. 
[Stage 2] A firm that acquires its environmental information can only disclose its 
environmental burden to consumers.
5
 If a firm acquires its environmental information, 
it could choose one among the following actions, {(i) disclose the environmental burden 
information, (ii) do not disclose the information (keep silent), and (iii) invest to improve 
the environmental burden and after that disclose its environmental information}.  
To improve its environmental burden, a firm has to incur the cost of investment 
, (0 )t t< . We postulate that the size of t  is common knowledge. A firm could reduce 
the environmental burden from be  to ge  by investment t . As a consequence, the 
profit of the firm is determined. If a firm does not acquire its environmental information, 
it can not disclose the information. The firm only keeps silent and obtains profit 
accordingly. 
Figures 1 ,2 and 3 depict the decision tree of each case. 
[Figure 1 here] 
[Figure 2 here] 
[Figure 3 here] 
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Case 1: Voluntary Disclosure 
If the government does not obligate environmental disclosure, the decision making 
of a monopoly firm is the following. First, we consider the decision making at point S in 
Figure 1. The expected profit of the firm when it acquires its environmental information 
is 
            ( ) (1 )max{ ( ) , ( )}
v
g gE e e t eλπ απ α π π= + − − .            (1) 
Because of the asymmetry of information, consumers can not distinguish the difference 
between a firm acquiring its environmental information and keeping silent, and a firm 
that did not acquire its environmental information from the beginning. In this case, 
consumers predict the silent firms’ environmental burden as eλ  and the following 
inequality holds 
be e eµ λ< <  (see Appendix 1). 
The condition that the firm invests to improve its environmental burden is 
                    ( ) ( )ge t eλπ π− ≥                             (2) 
and the expected profit in disclosing its environmental information, vIEπ , is given by 
                     ( ) (1 ).
vI
gE e tπ π α= − −    
 
                      (3) 
The condition that the firm does not invest is 
                      ( ) ( )ge t eλπ π− < .                              (4) 
The expected profit vNEπ  is, therefore, 
11 
                    ( ) (1 ) ( )vN gE e eλπ απ α π= + − .                     (5) 
On the other hand, if the firm does not acquire its environmental information, it could 
earn the profit ( )eλπ . 
Next, considering the decision making of stage1, the condition of environmental 
information acquired is 
                     ( )vE k eλπ π− ≥ .                              (6) 
Then, if (2) is satisfied, the condition of environmental information acquired is 
( ) (1 ) ( )ge t e kλπ α π− − − ≥ . If (4) is satisfied, the condition of environmental 
information acquired is { ( ) ( )}ge e kλα π π− ≥ . 
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that information disclosure is voluntary. Then 
(i) If (6) is not satisfied, a monopoly firm does not acquire its environmental 
information and obtain profit ( )eλπ . 
(ii) If (2) and (6) are satisfied, a monopoly firm acquires its environmental information 
and invests t . It then obtains vIEπ . In this case, environmental information is 
disclosed with the probability 
( )
0
( )
vIE e
f k dk
λπ π−
∫  and the disclosed environmental 
burden is always 
ge . In addition, because of the asymmetry of information, the 
expected profit of a brown firm is not ( )beπ  but ( )eλπ  in choosing 
12 
non-disclosure. 
(iii) If (4) and (6) are satisfied, a monopoly firm acquires its environmental information 
and does not invest. It then obtains vNEπ . In this case, environmental information 
is disclosed with the probability 
( )
0
( )
vNE e
f k dk
λπ π
α
−
∫   and the disclosed 
environmental burden is always 
ge , and a non-disclosed firm obtains the expected 
profit ( )eλπ  due to the asymmetric information. 
 
Case 2: Mandatory Disclosure Policy; Partial Mandatory Disclosure 
Consider the case that the government obligates the disclosure of environmental 
information to a firm that has acquired its information. The decision making of a 
monopoly firm is the following. First, we consider the decision making at point S in 
Figure 2. The expected profit of the firm when it acquires its environmental information 
is 
( ) (1 )max{ ( ) , ( )}m g g bE e e t eπ απ α π π= + − −                  (7) 
In this case, if a firm acquires its environmental information, it must disclose the 
information. Therefore, if a firm does not make an investment, the environmental 
burden is disclosed as 
ge . 
The condition that the firm invests to improve its environmental burden is 
13 
                        ( ) ( )g be t eπ π− ≥ ,                           (8) 
and the expected profit of disclosing its environmental information, mIEπ , is given by 
                      ( ) (1 ).
mI
gE e tπ π α= − −     
 
                   (9) 
This value is equal to vIEπ . The condition that the firm does not invest is 
                         ( ) ( )g be t eπ π− <                             (10) 
Then the expected profit mNEπ  is, therefore, 
                     ( ) (1 ) ( )
mN
g bE e eπ απ α π= + − .                    (11) 
mNEπ  equals to ( )eµπ . On the other hand, if the firm does not acquire its 
environmental information, it can obtain the profit ( )eµπ . 
Considering the decision making of stage 1, the condition of environmental 
information acquired is 
                         ( )
mE k eµπ π− ≥ .                          (12) 
Then, if (8) is satisfied, the condition of environmental information acquired is 
( ) (1 ) ( )ge t e kµπ α π− − − ≥ . By assumption ( ) ( )e eµ λπ π> , the left hand side is smaller 
than the case of voluntary disclosure. Because asymmetric information does not exist in 
this case, a firm has lower incentive to acquire its environmental information than in the 
case of voluntary disclosure. If (10) is satisfied, the expected profit of acquiring 
environmental information is mNEπ  and it equals to ( )eµπ . Therefore, for all positive 
14 
acquisition costs k , the firm does not acquire environmental information and obtains 
the profit ( )eµπ .  
 
Proposition 2. Suppose that information disclosure is mandatory for firms that acquire 
their environmental information. Then 
(i) If (12) is not satisfied, a monopoly firm does not acquire its environmental 
information and obtains the profit ( )eµπ , and the environmental information is not 
disclosed. 
(ii) If (8) and (12) are satisfied, a monopoly firm acquires its environmental 
information and invests t . Then it obtains mIEπ . In this case, the probability that 
the environmental information is disclosed is 
( )
0
( )
mIE e
f k dk
µπ π−
∫  and the disclosed 
environmental information is only 
ge . 
(iii) If (10) and (12) are satisfied, a monopoly firm does not acquire the environmental 
information and obtains ( )eµπ . 
 
Case 3: Mandatory Disclosure; Full Mandatory Disclosure 
Considering the situation that the government obligates every firm to inevitably 
disclose its environmental information, the monopoly firm must then acquire its 
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environmental information and disclose it. Under this policy, a monopoly firm will 
always acquire their environmental information and there is no need to consider the 
decision making at stage1. The expected profit of the monopoly firm is given by 
               ( ) (1 )max{ ( ) , ( )}
M
g g bE e e t e kπ απ α π π= + − − − .        (13) 
The condition that the firm invests to improve its environmental burden is given by (8). 
Then, the expected profit MIEπ is given by 
                   ( ) (1 )
MI
gE e t kπ π α= − − − .                       (14) 
On the other hand, the condition that the firm does not invest is given by (10). Then, the 
expected profit MNEπ  is given by 
                  ( ) (1 ) ( )
MN
g bE e e kπ απ α π= + − − ,                  (15) 
and MNEπ  equals to ( )e kµπ − . 
 
Proposition 3. Suppose that information disclosure is mandatory for all firms. A firm in 
the market inevitably discloses its environmental burden. Then 
(i) If (8) is satisfied, a firm invests for the reduction of its environmental burden. Then 
the expected profit is MIEπ . 
(ii) If (10) is satisfied, a firm does not invest for the reduction of its environmental 
burden. Then the expected profit is MNEπ  and MNEπ  is smaller than the initial 
16 
situation for every positive k . 
 
As a result, the problems of asymmetric information still exist under voluntary 
disclosure. Consumers can not distinguish a firm that acquires its environmental burden 
information and remains silent, from a firm that does not acquire it. Therefore, a brown 
firm obtains a larger profit by choosing non-disclosure over mandatory disclosure. 
Under the voluntary approach, a monopoly firm would obtain a higher profit than the 
mandatory disclosure case. On the other hand, mandatory disclosure resolves the 
problem of asymmetric information. As there are no benefits resulting from asymmetric 
information, a monopoly firm would invest more than the voluntary disclosure case. 
 
3. Comparison of Disclosure Policies 
In this section, we compare the effects of each disclosure policy on social welfare. 
First, we analyze the effects of these policies on the reduction of a firm’s environmental 
burden. In the initial situation, the environmental burden is eµ . Under voluntary 
disclosure, investment that reduces environmental burden is carried out if (2) is satisfied. 
Then the environmental burden is 
            
( )
0 ( )
( ) ( )
vI
vI
E e k
E
vI
g
e
e f k dk e f k dke
λ
λ
π π
µ π π
−
−
+= ∫ ∫ .                (16) 
17 
( )
0
( )
vIE e
f k dk
λπ π−
∫  is the probability that a monopoly firm acquires its environmental 
information. Therefore, the environmental burden vIe  is smaller than the initial one. If 
(4) is satisfied, investment is not carried out and the environmental burden remains in 
the initial situation eµ . 
Under the partial mandatory disclosure policy, if (8) is satisfied, a firm that acquires 
its environmental information carries out the investment. Then the environmental 
burden mIe  is 
    
( )
0 ( )
( ) ( ) .
mI
mI
E e k
E e
mI
ge f k dk e f ke dk
µ
µ
π π
µ π π
−
−
+= ∫ ∫                (17) 
The environmental burden mIe is smaller than the initial one. In addition, 
( ) ( )vI mIE e E eλ µπ π π π− > −  holds since 
vI mIE Eπ π=  and ( ) ( )e eλ µπ π< . Therefore, 
mI vIe e>  holds. If (10) is satisfied, the environmental burden remains in eµ . 
Under the full mandatory disclosure policy, if (8) is satisfied, a firm inevitably 
carries out the investment. Then the environmental burden MIe  is 
                            
MI
ge e=                   
              (18) 
If (10) is satisfied, the environmental burden is eµ . As a consequence, 
MI vI mIe e e< <  
holds where (2) is satisfied. The effects of investment on environmental burden are 
depicted in Figure 4. 
[Figure 4 here] 
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Under voluntary disclosure, the area where environmental burden is reduced from 
the initial situation is ①＋②  in Figure 4 and the expected investment cost is 
( )
0
( ) ( )
( ( )1 )
2
vIE e g
f
e e
k dk
λπ π λπ πα
− −
− ∫ , where 
( ) ( )
2
ge eλπ π−
is the average cost of 
investment. Under the partial mandatory disclosure policy, the area is ①＋④ in 
Figure 4 and the expected investment cost is 
( )
0
( ) (
(1 )
)
( )
2
mI e g bE
f
e
k
e
k d
µπ π π π
α
− −
− ∫ . 
Under the full mandatory disclosure policy , the area is ①＋②＋③＋④＋⑤+⑥ in 
Figure 4 and the expected investment cost is
( ) ( )
(1 )
2
g be eπ πα
−
− . Therefore, under the 
full mandatory disclosure policy, the environmental burden is lower than that of other 
policies. In addition, if the investment cost t  is low, that is ( )
vIt E eλπ π< − , the 
environmental burden of voluntary disclosure is lower than that of partial mandatory 
disclosure policy. This is because voluntary disclosure gives the firm a larger incentive 
to acquire its environmental information than partial mandatory disclosure because the 
effects of asymmetric information exist. Moreover, the upper limit of investment cost in 
voluntary disclosure is ( ) ( )ge eλπ π− , which is lower than that of mandatory 
disclosures. On the other hand, under the full mandatory disclosure, the expected cost of 
investment reducing environmental burden 
( ) ( )
(1 )
2
g be eπ πα
−
−  is higher than that of 
other policies.
6
 This is because full mandatory disclosure does not allow the firm to 
choose non-disclosure. 
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Next, we consider the welfare of consumers and monopoly firms. Under voluntary 
disclosure, the environmental burden of a silent firm is inferred as eλ  by consumers. 
Then if (2) is satisfied, the firm chooses to invest and the welfare vIW  is, 
( )
0
( )
( ) ( )
0 0
0
0
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( .1
2
)
vI
vI
vI vI
g
E e
k
E e
E e
v p
vI e
g
v p
E eg
e
f k dk
f k dk
e e
f k dk kf k
W v e c h d
e c h d
dk
vλ
λ
λ
λ λ
π π
π
π πλ
λπ
π ππ
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
π
α
−
−
− −
−
−
= − −
+ − −
−− −
−
∫
∫
∫
∫
∫
∫           (19) 
In this case, consumers obtain higher utility than in the initial situation by the following 
two effects; the effect of improvement of environmental burden by investment and the 
effect of environmental information disclosure. Furthermore, consumers infer that the 
environmental burden of a silent firm is eλ , which is smaller than the initial 
environmental burden eµ . 
If (4) is satisfied under voluntary disclosure, the welfare vNW  is 
0
( )
0
( )
0 ( )
( )
0
0
(( )
( ) ( )
) (
}
( ) .
)
{(1 ) ( ) ( )
vN
vN
vN
v
g
N
E e
E e k
E e
E
v p
vN e
g
v p
e
e
W vf k dk
f k
e c h d
vdk f k dk
kf k
e c h
k
d
d
λ
λ
λ
λ
λ
π π
π
π π
π π
λ
π
α θ θ θ
α θ θ θ
−
−
−
−
−
−
= −
+ −
−
+
−
− −
∫
∫∫
∫
∫
∫   
(20) 
In the case of (20), the environmental burden is not improved and consumers only 
obtain the effect of environmental information disclosure.  
Under the partial mandatory disclosure policy, the firm that acquires its 
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environmental information must disclose it. Therefore consumers infer the 
environmental burden of the silent firm as eµ . In the case (8) is satisfied, if the firm 
acquires its environmental information, it carries out investment. Then, the welfare of 
consumers and the monopoly firm is 
( )
0
( )
( )
0
0
0
( )
0
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) .1 ( ( ))
2
mI
mI
g
mI mI
E e
k
E e
E e E e
v p
mI e
g
v p
e
g b
f kW v e c h d
v e c h d
dk
f k dk
f k dk kf k dk
e e
µ
µ
µ
µ µ
π π
π π
π π π π
µ
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
π π
α
−
−
−
−
− −
= − −
+ − −
−
− − −
∫
∫
∫
∫
∫
∫
    (21) 
In this situation, consumers can receive the effect of improvement of environmental 
burden by investment and the effect of environmental information disclosure. On the 
other hand, the environmental burden of silent firms is eµ  under the partial mandatory 
policy. In (19), (20) and (21), the first line of the right hand side is welfare in the case 
that environmental information is disclosed, and the second line is welfare in the case 
that information is not disclosed. The third line expresses the expected cost of 
investment and acquiring environmental information. In the case (10) is satisfied, a 
monopoly firm does not acquire its environmental information. Then the welfare under 
the partial mandatory disclosure policy is 
0
( ) ( )
v p
mN eW v e c h dµ µθ θ θ
−
= − −∫
                     
   
(22) 
This is same as the initial situation. 
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Under the full mandatory disclosure policy, the firm must disclose its 
environmental burden information. In the case (8) is satisfied, the firm chooses to invest. 
Then, the welfare MIW  is 
0 0
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
2
.g
v p
kg bMI e
g
e e
W v e c h d kf k dk
π π
θ θ θ α
− −
= − − − − −∫ ∫
     
  (23) 
In this situation, consumers can obtain the effect of improvement of environmental 
burden by investment and the effect of environmental information disclosure. In 
addition, there are no silent firms. In the case (10) is satisfied, the welfare under the full 
mandatory disclosure policy is 
0 0 0
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .g b
v p v p
k
MN e e
g b
W v e c h d v e c h d kf k dkα θ θ θ α θ θ θ
− −
= − − + − − − −∫ ∫ ∫   (24) 
In this case, consumers could obtain the effect of environmental information disclosure. 
Consequently, the social welfare of each case is shown in Table 1. 
                          [Table 1 here] 
By disclosing environmental burdens, the demand for green firms increase and the 
demand for brown ones decrease. However, under full mandatory disclosure policy, 
environmental information is fully revealed, requiring the highest cost for information 
acquisition and investment. In addition, the probability of environmental information 
disclosure under voluntary disclosure is higher than that of partial mandatory disclosure 
policy. Furthermore, environmental burdens are improved in the cases of (v1), (m1), and 
22 
(M1). 
The expected profit of a monopoly firm is expressed in Table 2. 
[Table 2 here] 
As a result, the expected profit under (M2) policy is smaller than that in the initial 
situation. Full mandatory disclosure policy does not have the option for a firm to not 
acquire its environmental information. Under (M2) policy, therefore, even if a firm 
decreases its expected profit by acquiring information, the firm must acquire its 
environmental information. In addition, the expected profit under (m2) policy is equal 
to the initial one. There are three cases that a firm does not invest to improve its 
environmental burden, which are (v2), (m2), and (M2) policies. In these cases, only (v2) 
policy has the possibility of increasing the expected profit. This is because that under 
(v2) policy, the firm could obtain expected profit ( )eλπ  by the existence of asymmetric 
information if it acquired the environmental information and knew itself as brown. On 
the other hand, the comparison of the expected profit in three cases, (v1), (m1), and 
(M1) policies is not clear. In these cases, a firm carries out the investment and all cases 
have possibility of getting higher expected profit than the initial situation. 
 
Proposition 4. 
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(i) Among the three policies, full mandatory disclosure policy achieves full 
information disclosure and the lowest environmental burden. On the other hand, the 
cost of information acquisition and investment in full mandatory disclosure policy 
is higher than the others. 
(ii) Among the three policies, (v2), (m2), and (M2), the expected profit of a monopoly 
firm is the lowest under (M2) policy and (v2) policy could make the larger expected 
profit than the initial one. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Increasing environmental awareness of consumers affects the behavior of firms. 
Many consumers are interested in knowing the environmental burden information of 
firms. Under such circumstances, environmental information disclosure policies attract 
attention. On the other hand, if firms voluntarily disclose their environmental 
information, the problems of asymmetric information might be solved by market 
mechanisms without the intervention of the government. We have developed a model in 
which a firm can invest to reduce its environmental burden and disclose its 
environmental information, and compare the effects of three types of environmental 
policies. 
24 
We have solved the decision making problems of firms under the different policies. 
In this model, under voluntary disclosure, the probability that a firm acquires its 
environmental information is higher than that of mandatory disclosure. Moreover, a firm 
invests more under mandatory disclosure because under mandatory disclosure, the 
effects of asymmetric information disappear. The disclosure rule has effects on 
consumer utility, firm profit and environmental burden. The effects of each policy on 
social welfare are ambiguous. This depends on the size of each effect. Regarding each 
effect, full mandatory disclosure policy achieves full information disclosure and the 
lowest environmental burden. However, the cost of information acquisition and 
investment is higher than that of other policies and the expected profit is the lowest. 
Although voluntary disclosure might achieve a higher expected profit, it does not solve 
the problems of asymmetric information. 
 
Appendix 1 
In the case of voluntary disclosure, there are two types of silent firms. The first are 
firms that do not acquire their environmental information. Environmental burdens of 
this type are speculated eµ  by consumers, while the latter are firms that acquire their 
environmental information and they know their environmental burdens are be  and did 
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not invest. In this case, the environmental burden is 
b
e . Therefore, eλ  
is expressed as 
(1 ) be e eλ µγ γ= + − and γ  is posterior probability (0 1)γ< < . Therefore, be e eµ λ< <   
holds. If (2) is satisfied, thenγ  is given by 
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E e E e
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f k dk f k dk
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λ λ
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π π π π
γ
α
−
− −
−
=
− + −
∫
∫ ∫
. 
In addition, in the case of (4) is satisfied, the probability could calculate in the same 
way. 
 
Notes 
1
 Voluntary programs of firms are classified into unilateral commitments, public voluntary schemes 
and negotiated agreements. Some existing studies about voluntary programs are Arora and Cason 
(1996), Segerson and Miceli (1998), Lyon and Maxwell (2003), Friesen (2006), and Blanco et al. 
(2009). 
2
 In Polinsky and Shavell (2006), acquired information is about the harms of a firm’s goods. 
3
 For example, although each consumer cares about global warming and buys environmentally 
friendly goods, they can not realize the improving effects generated by their consumption. 
4
 We postulate that firms can not disclose disinformation. Sinclair-Desgagné and Gozlan (2003) 
analyze the case that disclosed information is not always accurate. 
5
 We postulate that firms can not disclose disinformation. 
6
 This relationship is sustained even if we include the acquisition cost of a firm’s environmental 
information. 
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Table 1: Social Welfare 
 
Policy Condition Social Welfare 
(v1) Voluntary disclosure (2) is satisfied (19)－(16) 
(v2) Voluntary disclosure (4) is satisfied (20)－ eµ  
(m1) Partial mandatory disclosure (8) is satisfied (21)－(17) 
(m2) Partial mandatory disclosure (10) is satisfied (22)－ eµ  
(M1) Full mandatory disclosure (8) is satisfied (23)－
ge  
(M2) Full mandatory disclosure (10) is satisfied (24)－ eµ  
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Table 2: Expected Profit 
 
Policy Expected Profit 
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